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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
viP

None.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court correctly ruled on the following issues: ( 1) Appellants' breach
of written contract failed because of the merger doctrine; (2) the collateral rights
exemption did not apply; (3) Appellants' part performance doctrine and estoppel
argument failed because (i) Appellants never alleged an oral contract existed, (ii)
Appellants' evidence did not refer exclusively to the contract alleged; and (4) Utah Code
v,

Annotated § 73-1-7 did not apply.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before
the trial court. Hart v. Salt Lake County, Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-130 (App. 1997). "In

viJ

an equity review of facts if the record shows a fair preponderance, or even if the evidence
is balanced evenly, the trial court finding should be sustained. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d
vii>

274, 275 (Utah 1983).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
\,fj)

None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Appellants' complaint alleged a breach of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement

\JP

("REPC"), part performance in the alternative or Utah Code Ann. §73-1-7. (R.1-8).
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Appellees contend that they never agreed to transfer shares of water at any time. (R.1236). Appellees further alleged that Appellants' entire lawsuit is predicated upon a forgery
that still failed to create a contract to transfer shares of water. (R.12-36). Appellees'
contentions of forgery were never adjudicated because the District Court granted their
motion for summary judgment. (R.12-36).
The District Court ruled that the merger doctrine extinguished the REPC and that
the operative document, the warranty deed, contained no transfer of water shares.
(R.242-249). The District Court further held that the phrase "negotiate shares at closing,"
by itself, could not create a contract; or in other words, no agreement to transfer shares of
water ever existed as a matter of law. (R.242-249).
The District Court also held that part performance failed as a matter of law
because Appellants neither presented facts that Appellants' actions exclusively referred to
a contract nor alleged the existence of an oral agreement in any of Appellants' pleadings,
sworn statements or otherwise. (R.242-249). The Appellants only referenced one
agreement, the REPC, which was bereft of any agreement or condition to transfer shares
of water. (R.1-8, 172-228, 242-249).
Now, Appellants' brief attempts to argue new issues not presented to the District
Court. First, Appellants argue that shares of water might be appurtenant to the land.
Second, Appellants essentially ditch their argument that Appellees breached the REPC
and argue that Appellees breached an "oral easement agreement." Appellants initially
argued that all evidence supported a written contract to transfer shares of water. And in
this appeal, Appellants argue that the REPC is evidence of a breach of an "oral easement
2
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agreement." Appellants never made mention of the existence of an "oral easement
agreement" or appurtenant water rights. Appellants' brief is an attempt to add new
causes of action to their complaint. Even if Appellants had presented these angles to the
~

District Court, their complaint would still fail as a matter of law.
Finally, the District Court acknowledged that Appellants did not allege any facts
to entertain an action under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7. Based upon these simple
indisputable facts, the District Court's ruling should be upheld.
II.

1,9

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Appellants and Appellees entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("REPC").
(R.242-249).
2. The District Court ruled that the merger doctrine applied and the warranty deed
became the operative document and the final agreement. (R.242-249).
3. The REPC no longer applies and the deed did not transfer water. (R.242-249).
4. The REPC contained both an abrogation and integration clause. (R.242-249).
5. The statement "negotiate shares at closing" did not establish that agreement was

\JJ

made. (R.242-249).
6. The collateral rights exception did not apply. (R.242-249).
7. Part performance and estoppel do not apply because Appellants do not contend an
oral contract exists and Appellants' evidence did not meet the exclusive referability
requirement. (R.242-249).
8. Appellants never alleged the water shares were appurtenant to the land nor did they
present any evidence with respect to this issue. (R.1-8, 172-228, 242-249).
3
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9. Appellants never alleged a breach of "oral easement agreement" at any time. (R.1-8,
172-228, 242-249).
10. Appellants never sought to enforce continued use of an irrigation pipeline as a basis
for their complaint. (R.1-8, 172-228, 242-249).
11. The REPC never stated that the purchase price included water rights. (R.1-8, 172228, 242-249).
12.Appellants claim under Utah Ann. Code§ 73-1-7 failed as a matter of law because
Appellants never presented an argument or evidence to the District Court that it
applied. (R.1-8, 172-228, 242-249).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Trial Court correctly ruled that Appellants' complaint does not hold water as a
matter of law. The District Court held that Appellants' own admissions, evidence and
pleadings established that no contract related to the transfer shares of water ever existed.
Now, Appellants for the first time in this appeal argue new causes of action
claiming that the shares of water were appurtenant to the land, that Appellants sought
continued use of a water pipeline, and that Appellees breached an "oral easement
agreement." Appellants never raised these issues prior to this appeal.
Furthermore, Appellants never presented any evidence to the District Court for
consideration of appurtenant water rights, continued use of a water pipeline or breach of
an "oral easement agreement." These arguments should not be allowed at this stage
because Appellants never preserved them at the District Court level and even if
considered, Appellants' complaint still falls woefully short of a valid complaint.
4
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ARGUMENT

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE MERGER
DOCTRINE, THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE, AND
RELATED LAW.

From the beginning, Appellants tactic has been to confuse the issues in an attempt
to create a contract out of whole cloth. Appellees' entire complaint arises from the Real
Estate Purchase Agreement (''REPC"); however, the District Court ruled that the merger
agreement abrogated the REPC. The District Court also held that Appellants could not
apply the collateral rights exemption because the issues relating to title were central
Vi

rather than collateral. Appellants' part performance argument failed because there was
neither an oral contract nor evidence exclusively referring to an oral agreement. Finally,
Appellants' arguments of appurtenant water rights, breach of an "oral easement
agreement" and continued use of a pipeline all fail as a matter of law.
A. The District Court Correctly Ruled that the Merger Doctrine Vitiated Appellants'
Complaint.
Utah Courts follow the merger doctrine which directs that the "deed is the final
agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and
unenforceable." Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977).
Appellants claim that Appellees agreed to transfer water shares and breached the

1-0

REPC. However, the REPC contained an abrogation clause and the warranty deed
extinguished any prior agreements upon closing. As the District Court correctly ruled,

vJi

the warranty deed became the final agreement when the parties closed and recorded the
deed. Thus, the merger doctrine is sufficient to wipe out Appellants entire complaint.
5
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B. The District Court Correctly Held that the Language "Negotiate Shares at
Closing" Did Not Constitute an Agreement to Transfer Shares of Water.
Appellants argue for specific perfonnance claiming "The REPC clearly constitutes
an agreement to transfer water shares." But, the District Court disagreed. The District
Court held, "even if the REPC was somehow still a valid, enforceable contract, the
statement "negotiate shares at closing" could not transfer shares of water. The District
Court stated at best, the statement expresses a future intent to enter into the contract. The
REPC does not constitute a contract to transfer the shares of water or an irrigation
pipeline." (R.242-249).
The Appellants argue:
Trial Court failed to consider the ambiguity inherent in Section 1.2 which states that
water rights/shares are included in the purchase price but which is followed by language
which the trial court deems merely an expression of future intent. Nevertheless, the
REPC tenns are reasonably certain in that it sets forth the intent of the Defendants to sell
a lot to the Plaintiff which includes water rights.
(Appellants' Brief, page 5.).
~

Contrary to Appellants' argument, the District Court did consider the ambiguity
and found Appellants' extrinsic evidence utterly void of any agreement that required
Appellees to transfer shares of water or an irrigation pipeline.
Appellants' reliance on Alvey v. Reed, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), is completely
misplaced and incorrect. The Alvey court dealt with an entirely different scenario. For
one, the merger doctrine played no part in Alvey. In addition, the Alvey court had an
actual agreement that merely lacked incidental details. In Alvey, the court ordered that
defendant honor the contract to sell land and supply key terms.
6
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Here, the District Court ruled that there was no contract to transfer shares of water.
The District Court did not state that an agreement existed, but lacked key terms to
specifically enforce the contract.
Appellants point to extrinsic facts in an attempt to create an agreement that the
District Court ruled never existed as a matter of law. The District Court correctly ruled
with respect to specific performance.
C. The District Court Correctly Held that the Collateral Rights Exception to the
Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply as a Matter of Law.
This District Court gave two reasons that the collateral rights exception did not
apply in this case. First, the District Court held that the collateral rights exception
"applies when the seller's performance involves some act collateral to the conveyance of
v;

title" and "that issues relating to title are central rather than collateral to agreements for
the sale of real estate;" and second, the statement in the REPC did not create an
agreement to transfer shares of water, and at a minimum, Appellants need an agreement.
Appellants' brief never presented anything to show that Appellees' performance
involved an act collateral to the conveyance of title. Appellants only argue that the

l,Jj

collateral rights exception applies because the Alvey case created a contract. However, as
previously stated, Alvey did not establish new law that a party can create a contract where
none originally existed.
The District Court correctly held that the collateral rights exception did not apply
in this case.

7
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D. Appellants' Argument Related to Water Being Appurtenant to the Land Fails as a
Matter of Law Because Appellants Did Not Raise the Issue with The District
Court and Appellants Present No Legal Basis to Establish this Claim.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before
the trial court. Hart v. Salt Lake County, Com 'n, 945 P .2d 125, 129-130 (App. 1997).
Appellants now argue that the water shares are appurtenant to the land. Appellants failed
to preserve this issue for appeal and Appellees' request that the Appeals Court not allow
this argument.
In any event, Utah Code Ann.§ 73-1-11(5) states that for purposes of land
conveyances only, a water right evidenced by any of the following documents is
appurtenant to the land: ( 1) a decree entered by a court; (2) a certificate issued under
Section 73-3-17; (3) a diligence claim for surface or underground water filed pursuant to
Section 73-5013; (4) a water user's claim executed for general determination of water
rights proceedings conducted pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 4, Determination of Water
Rights, or pursuant to Section 73-3-16; (5) an approval for an application to appropriate
water issued under Section 73-3-1 0; (6) an approval for an application to permanently
change the place of use of water issued under Section 73-3-10; or (7) an approval for an
application to exchange water issued under Section 73-3-20.
Appellants do not present any evidence in the record that demonstrates that water
~

shares are appurtenant to the land. Appellants make a faint mention of "water
certificates," but, Appellants neither presented any evidence to the District Court nor this
Court to establish that the water is appurtenant to the land.

8
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Based upon the foregoing, Appellants' new argument should not be considered
vu

and the District Court's ruling should be affirmed.
E. The District Court Properly Applied Spears Because of a Clear Integration Clause.
The District Court held Spears v. Warr, 43 P.3d 742 had been overruled in part
and that Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 183 P.3d 326, 331 (Utah 2008) did not allow
extrinsic evidence in the face of a clear integration clause. Appellants argue that transfer
of water by certificate is a collateral right but present no legal argument to support this
contention, nor do Appellants present evidence of any water certificates.
Appellants next argue that Alvey states that extrinsic evidence may be looked at to
clarify uncertainty in a contract. However, as previously stated, the District Court did
look at extrinsic evidence, but found no agreement. It further ruled that no agreement to
specifically enforce existed, hence, there is no reason to look to extrinsic evidence.
The District Court indicated that the REPC contained a clear integration clause
and also correctly ruled that extrinsic evidence is not allowed.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PART
PERFORMANCE DOCTRINE DID NOT PROVIDE A LEGAL CAUSE
OF ACTION.
The Trial Court correctly ruled that part performance did not apply because ( 1)

appellants never contended that an oral contract ever existed; and (2) appellants' acts did
vJ

not exclusively refer to a contract to possess water. Also, Appellants again present a new
issue never raised before the District Court.

9
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A. Appellants Never Contended Appellees and Appellants Entered into an Oral
Contract.
The part performance doctrine requires an oral contract that is clear and definite.
Spears, 44. P.3d at 751. The District Court ruled that Appellants neither presented any
evidence of an oral contract nor produced any clear and definite terms. In all of
Appellants' pleadings, sworn statements and evidence, Appellants never identified any
oral agreement or clear and definite terms of an agreement. Appellants only alleged the
breach of the REPC. Appellants never argued breach of a different agreement. The
District Court also ruled that the phrase "negotiate shares at closing" undeniably vague
and impossibly ambiguous. This alone vitiates Appellants' argument for part
performance.
B. Appellants Never Presented Evidence that Satisfied Exclusivity.
Acts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in that the
possession of the party seeking specific performance and the improvements made must
be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract exists. Martin v. Scholl,
678 P.2d 274,275 (Utah 1983). "In an equity review of facts if the record shows a fair
preponderance, or even if the evidence is balanced evenly, the trial court finding should
be sustained." Scholl, 678 P.2d at 274.
After weighing Appellants' extrinsic evidence, the District Court still held that
Appellants' acts were not exclusively referable to a contract to possess water shares or
the irrigation pipeline. The District Court concluded that the Appellants' actions could
have been done because the Appellees' allowed the Appellants use of the Appellees'
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water and irrigation pipeline in exchange for the Appellants' contribution to the cost of
VlP

the construction, and payment of the water assessments they used. The Appellants never
contradicted this statement.
Appellants now argue that the District Court got it wrong because the Appellants

vi

should have been allowed to force Appellees to grant Appellants "continued use of the
water pipeline." (See Page 12, § 12 of Appellants' Brief). But, Appellants never raised
this issue before the District Court. Appellants argued to the District Court that
Appellees breached the REPC by not transferring shares of water, not that Appellees
breached an agreement to grant a "pipeline easement across the back of [Appellees ']
property."
Furthermore, Appellants' brief misapplies Scholl 's rule of relaxing the exclusive
I.@

referability requirement because Appellants leave out the requirement that the contract
must have great clarity and definiteness. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 278. The District Court held
that Appellants' lack of clarity to be the least of Appellants' problems because Appellants
never even contended that an oral contract existed. Thus, Appellants could never meet
the burden that allows a court to avoid the exclusivity rule.
C. Appellants Now Claim Breach of an "Oral Easement Agreement."
Strangely enough, for the first-time, Appellants attempt to conjure up a different
contract as a basis that the District Court made a mistake. Appellants now argue that "the
referable contract" was an "oral easement agreement" and not the REPC. Appellants
vi)

argue that the REPC is not the operative document but merely evidence of an "oral
easement agreement."
11
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On page 14, paragraph 2 of Appellants' brief, Appellants now claim the REPC is
evidence of an "oral easement agreement." This is extremely disingenuous. Throughout
all of Appellants' pleadings, evidence and sworn statements, never at any time do
Appellants argue that Appellees breached an "oral easement agreement." That contention
is misleading and a misstatement of the facts.
The Appellants appear to be arguing that the issue before the District Court was
"to allow Plaintiffs the continued use of the water pipeline after [Appellees] shut off
Plaintiffs from using it ... " That was never an issue before the District Court. So
now, Appellants argue that instead of the REPC being the contract at issue, the referable
agreement was the "an oral easement agreement." Appellants never once argued to the
District Court that an oral easement agreement on Appellees' property was the contract at
issue. This is clear because the District Court pointed out that, "the Plaintiffs do not
contend that an oral contract was ever made."
Appellants merely attempt to cloud the issues at hand in an effort to create some
cause of action. The District Court's ruling and order should be upheld.
D. The District Court Correctly Ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 Did Not
Apply because Appellants Did Not Allege a Ditch or Canal.
Appellants never argued or presented evidence that the complaint arose from a
ditch or canal. Appellants cause of action under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 could not
provide a basis for relief as a matter of law. Thus, the District Court's ruling and order
should be upheld.

12
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the statutes, case law and arguments herein, the District Court
correctly ruled in granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
Appellees respectfully request that the District Court's ruling be affirmed and that they be
allowed to seek additional attorney's fees and costs associated with opposing this appeal.
Dated this 15 th day of August, 2017.

Burke Huber, Esq.

Attorney for De endants/Appellees

13
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Kyle D. Ashworth and Jamie Ashworth,
husband and wife,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 150800137

vs.

Riki L. Lewis and Brenda H. Lewis, husband
and wife,

Judge CLARK A. McCLELLAN

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Undisputed Material Facts
1. The parties are neighbors whose yards share a common border in Maeser, Uintah
County.
2. The Plaintiffs reside at 2919 W. 1000 N. The Defendants reside at 2943 W. 1000

N.
3. In approximately 2006 or 2007, the Defendants subdivided their property which
resulted in several new lots, both to the east and west of the Defendants' current
residence.
4. The Plaintiffs purchased the lot directly to the east of Defendants' residence from
the Defendants and closed on that purchase in February 2007.
5. Paragraph 1.2 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "REPC") concerning water
1
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rights/water shares states "negotiate shares at closing."

vi

6. The REPC was agreed to by the parties and dated November 1, 2006.
7. The REPC is an integrated document with an abrogation clause.
8. The Warranty Deed was signed and recorded on February 7, 2007.

uP

9. The Warranty Deed does not reference any water shares or water rights to the
Plaintiffs.
I 0. An irrigation pipeline was built in a five foot easement directly west of Defendants'
property in July of 2009.
11. The Plaintiffs paid for a portion of the construction cost of the irrigation pipeline so
that they could receive water from the Defendants. The Plaintiffs paid $1,077.30
for the cost of construction, which was half of the total price paid.
12. The Plaintiffs paid for the water assessments charged to the Defendants by the
water company.
13. In the spring of 2013, the Defendants ceased providing water to the Plaintiffs and
shut off the water.
Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon

County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and evidence are
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989).
The Plaintiffs are seeking title to certain water shares, as well as use of the irrigation

2

vJ
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pipeline. The Plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth three causes of action: (1) breach of the REPC; (2)
vJ

alternatively, part performance and equitable estoppel; and (3) also in the alternative, Utah Code§
73-1-7 which applies to use of a canal or ditch.
The Plaintiffs allege that during negotiations for the purchase of the real property, they
believed that the Defendants would transfer to them water shares the Defendants owned. The
Plaintiffs also allege that the parties agreed th~t

an irrigation pipeline would be built so water could

be delivered to the Plaintiffs' property. The Plaintiffs claim the agreement is memorialized in
paragraph 1.2 of the REPC. Paragraph 1.2 pertains to the transfer of water and contains the hand
written statement "negotiate water shares at closing."
The warranty deed was signed and recorded on February 7, 2007. The warranty deed does
not reference the transfer of any water shares or the use or ownership of an irrigation pipeline.
Utah courts follow the merger doctrine which directs that the "deed is the final agreement
and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and unenforceable." Stubbs v.

Hemmert, 561 P .2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977).
The warranty deed constitutes the parties' final agreement. The written REPC agreement
and any oral agreement the parties may have ·fhaae were:extinguished when the warranty deed was
1

signed and recorded. The REPC and any oral. 'agreements are unenforceable. The extent of the
property the Plaintiffs purchased and own is limited to that which is described in the warranty
deed. The Plaintiffs had a duty to ensure that the property described in the warranty deed
reflected what they intended to purchase and was fully included in the final document.

va
Consequently, the doctrine of merger applies, and any other agreement the Plaintiffs may have
made concerning the disputed property is subsumed by the warranty deed.
VP
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Additionally, even if the REPC was somehow still a valid, enforceable contract, the
vJ

statement "negotiate shares at closing" does not establish that an agreement was made. At best,
the statement expresses a future intent to enter into a contract. The REPC does not constitute a
contract to transfer the shares of water or an irrigation pipeline.
The Plaintiffs argue that they should be allowed to present extrinsic evidence to show the
existence of a contract. The Plaintiffs claim that their contribution to the cost of construction of
the irrigation pipeline, as well as their use of the pipeline, and payment of water assessments,
supports a finding that an agreement was made. The Plaintiffs argue the warranty deed was not an
integrated document, and according to Spears v. Warr, 43 P.3d742 (Utah 2002), extrinsic evidence
must be considered to determine if the warranty deed is in fact an integrated document.
The Plaintiffs' argument on this point fails. Spears has been overruled to the extent that it
supports allowing extrinsic evidence on the issue of integration where an integration clause is

'-d

present in the contract. See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 183 P.3d 326, 331 (Utah
2008)("[W]e will not allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the
question of integration in the face of a clear integration clause.") The parties' REPC contains a
clear integration clause in paragraph 14. Consequently, any extrinsic evidence of an agreement is
barred by the parties' contract.
The Plaintiffs also argue that the transfe~ of water shares was collateral to the sale of the lot
to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiffs ~g~e'fli~ti the collateral rights exception to the merger
doctrine applies.
The collateral rights exception "applies when the seller's performance involves some act
collateral to the conveyance of title." Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P .2d 446, 450 (Utah App. 1996).
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"Issues relating to title are central rather than collateral to agreements for the sale of real estate."

Id. Even if the collateral rights exception applied, the statement in the REPC concerning the
negotiation of shares of water at closing does not establish an agreement was made to transfer
water or ownership of the irrigation pipeline. The REPC does not support a finding that an
agreement to transfer water was made, only that it would be negotiated in the future. For that
reason, the Plaintiffs' argument on the collateral rights exception also fails.
The Plaintiffs' first cause of action fails because of the merger doctrine.
The Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the doctrines of part perfonnance and equitable
estoppel apply. The Plaintiffs argue that the Statute of Frauds does not prevent recognition of an
oral contract because of the partial perfonnance doctrine.
"Generally, a conveyance of real property is within the statute of frauds and unenforceable
absent a writing." Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). ·"However, the doctrine of
~

part performance allows a court of equity to :enforce. ai1 oral agreement, if it has been partially
performed, notwithstanding the statute [of frauds]." Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1998).
The part performance doctrine requires:

[ 1] the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; [2] the acts done in
performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts
must be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they
would not have been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to
perform on the part of the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who
relied, since damages would be inadequate.
Reliance may be made in
innumerable ways, all of which could refer exclusively to the contract.

Spears, 44 P.3d at 751.
However, in Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983), the Court explained:
[A]cts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in that the
possession of the party seeking spe~ifiq p~ef0IJ11ance and the improvements made
,; '··

J• ' .. '-·• .• :,! .•
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by him [or her] must be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract
exists. The reason for such a requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part
performance is based on estoppel and unless the acts of part performance are
exclusively referable to the contract, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff
relied on it or changed hi [ or her] position to his prejudice ....

Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275.
Here, the acts of the Plaintiffs are not exclusively referable to a contract to possess water
..
shares or the irrigation pipeline. The Plain1iff.s poi:qt to paying half the cost of construction for the
pipeline, paying the water assessments, and using the pipeline, as evidence of part performance.
A lease agreement between the parties could also reasonably explain the Plaintiffs' actions. The
Plaintiffs' actions could have been done because the Defendants allowed the Plaintiffs use of the
Defendants' water and irrigation pipeline in exchange for the Plaintiffs' contribution to the cost of
the construction, and payment of the water assessments they used. Consequently, the Plaintiffs'
actions are not exclusively referable to a contract to transfer water shares, and ownership of the
irrigation pipeline.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs do not contend that an oral contract was ever made. Therefore,
the terms of a non-existent oral contract are o_~viously not definite and clear. The Plaintiffs
only claim that the written REPC constitute/th~ p~e~ :agreement, or that a contract can be
implied based on the Plaintiffs' actions. The Plaintiffs offer no facts supporting the finding of an
oral contract between the parties.
The Plaintiffs' part performance claim fails because there are no facts establishing an oral
contract, and because the Plaintiffs actions are not exclusively referable to a contract.
Finally, the Plaintiffs third cause of action relies on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 which
prohibits blocking the use of a canal or ditch. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 states "[t]his section is
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v;

not applicable to any type of water conveyance infrastructure other than a canal or ditch described
V,

in this section." Canal or ditch is not defined in this particular code section. The Utah legislature
has defined "water conveyance" in Utah Code Ann.§ 57-13a-101 as a "canal, ditch, pipeline, or

other means of conveying water." Clearly, based on that definition the Utah legislature
~

understood there is a difference between a canal, ditch, and a pipeline. If the legislature intended
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 to apply to pipelines, as well as a canal or ditch, the legislature would
have simply used the term water conveyance. The fact that the legislature did not use the term
water conveyance in Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 indicates it was the legislature's intent not to have
that particular code section apply to pipelines, but specifically to canals and ditches.
ui>

The Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege a ditch or canal is involved as it is understood
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7. The Complaint alleges facts concerning a pipeline.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7 fails as a matter of law.
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Pursuant to Code v. Utah
Dept. of Health, 162 P.3d I 097 (Utah 2007), and Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the parties are notified

that this is the final ruling and order in this case. The parties need not prepare or submit any other
order.

Dated this
~

U

':iay of

t)e,f-.1,...._

, 2016.

BY THE COURT:
>

CLARK A. McCLELLAN, District Court Judge

VP
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